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WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE CONTROLLING 
SHAREHOLDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DELAWARE 
BY MARCEL KAHAN AND EDWARD ROCK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
When the federal government is the controlling shareholder, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity transforms the legal structures of account-
ability.  Procedurally, the government and its agents can only be sued in 
federal court. Substantively, claims must be brought within one of the 
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity (the Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
Tucker Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act).  Although in the right 
circumstances plausible claims could be brought in Delaware against the 
directors of a government-controlled Delaware corporation, we argue that 
Delaware should avoid a confrontation with Washington, and that the best 
way to do so is to take advantage of the flexibility provided by Delaware 
Court of Chancery Rule 19.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the first time in living memory, the federal government owns 
controlling stock positions in major private corporations.  The United States 
Treasury owns 60% of General Motors (GM),1 56% of GMAC,2 26% of 
Citigroup,3 and 77.9% of American International Group (AIG),4 all Dela-
ware corporations.  In addition, it owns 79.9% of Fannie Mae and 79.9% of 
Freddie Mac, both of which are government-sponsored enterprises.5 
 
                                                                                                             
∗This is a written version of the 2009 Francis G. Pileggi Distinguished Lecture in Law, 
delivered by Edward Rock in Wilmington, Delaware on October 9, 2009.  Many thanks to the staff 
of The Delaware Journal of Corporate Law and Linda Flaharty for all their hard work in organizing 
the lecture and in shepherding this article through publication. 
1See Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M. Future on a Day of Pain, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1. 
2Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. to Give $3.6 Billion More in Aid to GMAC; Move Makes 
Government the Majority Owner of Troubled Auto Lender, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2009, at A1. 
3David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Discord Behind TARP Exits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703323704574602552053952422.html; Michael 
Corkery, The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Citigroup's Botched Stock Sale, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/12/17/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-citigroups-botched-stock-sale/. 
 4Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Reports Loss of $61.7 Billion as U.S. 
Gives More Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/business 
/03aig.hml?pagewanted=1. 
5Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B1.  
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When the government is the controlling shareholder, the account-
ability structures are fundamentally transformed both procedurally and 
substantively: any claims against the controlling shareholder are adjudicated 
in federal court under federal law, with very uncertain results.  Although 
claims against officers and directors of Delaware corporations who are not 
federal employees can be adjudicated in the Delaware state courts under 
ordinary principles of Delaware corporate law, doing so would put Delaware 
in a difficult position.  In this article, we argue that in such circumstances, 
Delaware's optimal strategy is to "duck" such disputes, and we provide a 
roadmap for how Delaware should do so.6 
A quick glance through the financial pages provides numerous exam-
ples of government interference in decisions that traditionally have been 
viewed as private management responsibility.  A few illustrations will suf-
fice.  In the wake of the federal bailout of Chrysler and GM, there was con-
gressional pressure to prevent the closure of GM and Chrysler dealers.7  The 
Treasury, beginning with AIG's bonus scandal and continuing through the 
work of the compensation "czar" Kenneth Feinberg, has been heavily in-
volved in executive compensation in bailed-out institutions.8  There has been 
continual pressure on government-supported banks, including Citigroup, to 
increase lending to small businesses and to restructure loans to consumers.9 
All of this is only the tip of the iceberg.  It reflects instances of federal 
pressures that have come to light in the short period of time since the 
government obtained control of these various companies.  If government 
control is not quickly dismantled, these instances are bound to multiply.  
                                                                                                             
Through its position as a creditor, the federal government also controls Bank of America.  See 
Appelbaum, supra note 2 (noting Bank of America's efforts to repay government aid). 
6To examine an even broader set of issues raised by government ownership, see generally 
J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice (George 
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-43, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146 
1143. 
7Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, Senators Blast Automakers Over Dealer Closings; GM, 
Chrysler Defend Massive Shutdowns, WASH. POST, June 4, 2009, at A15. 
8See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront Upsurge of 
Populist Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1; see also Brady Dennis, AIG Plans Millions More 
in Bonuses; Troubled Insurer Is in Talks with U.S. Over $250 Million, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009, 
at A1 (discussing post-bailout regulation of AIG executive bonuses); Liam Pleven & Deborah 
Solomon, AIG Seeks Clearance to Release Bonuses, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at C1 (discussing 
the same). 
9See, e.g., Christi Parsons & Peter Nicholas, "We Will Rebuild, We Will Recover," L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (quoting President Obama as saying banks "'will have to clearly 
demonstrate how taxpayer dollars result in more lending for the American taxpayer'"); see also Ross 
Kerber, Banks Draw Heavy Fire from Capitol Hill; Legislators Lash Out, Saying Financial Firms 
Haven't Met Their End of the Bailout Bargain, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2008, at B7; Ross Kerber, 
Businesses in N.E. Say Lenders Too Strict Terms Toughen, Despite Flow of Federal Funds, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the examples above do not reflect any of the more 
subtle pressures on companies and their executives that have not yet made it 
into the press. 
How did we get here?  More quickly than one would have thought im-
aginable.  It started in March 2008 with the Treasury and Federal Reserve's 
(Fed) ad hoc facilitation of the rescue of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan 
Chase.10  It continued with the summer 2008 rescue of Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac.11  It reached gale force in the September 2008 bailout of AIG and 
the October 2008 enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (EESA), which resulted in the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) that provided investments in Citigroup, Bank of America, and 
numerous other banks.12  It culminated in the December 2008 rescue of 
GMAC,13 and the spring 2009 bailouts of GM and Chrysler.14 
In the course of these high speed rescues, the Treasury acquired stock 
(both voting and nonvoting) and warrants in numerous public companies.  
To make things even more difficult, the government response was perforce 
enacted in haste with shifting goals and minimal guidance on how ownership 
positions should be held or managed.  Although there is no evidence that the 
purpose was to exercise control, the rescues have provided numerous 
opportunities for the exercise of control.  Stock ownership (especially 
controlling stakes) creates the power to interfere, and numerous formal 
opportunities to do so (on every issue that must be approved by the share-
holders at the annual meeting).  Moreover, stock ownership creates virtually 
unlimited informal opportunities for various governmental actors to exert 
influence and reduces the political cost of interference by diminishing its 
salience and visibility.  Helpful suggestions, comments, or advice to the 
CEO about how to run the company, made by a Treasury official or an im-
portant member of Congress at a cocktail party or in a telephone conver-
 
                                                                                                             
10For more details, see generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard 
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 
EMORY L.J. 713 (2009) (analyzing how Delaware avoided muddying its corporate law and injecting 
itself into international economic policy by deferring tough legal questions to New York courts). 
11See Story, supra note 5 (detailing federal intervention to save Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac). 
12See Matthew Ericson et al., Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, http:// 
projects. nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table (providing a comprehensive list of recipients of the 
TARP funds).  For a detailed review of these events, see generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG 
TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
13See Appelbaum, supra note 2 (discussing the federal government's assistance of GMAC). 
14See Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, GM, Chrysler Seek Billions More in Aid; Firms to 
Cut 50,000 Jobs, Drop 6 Brands, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1. 
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sation, carry an entirely different weight when the government controls 30% 
to 80% of the company's equity. 
In principle, of course, there is nothing wrong with major equity 
holders influencing the way their companies do business.  Yet, as we argue 
below, the presence of the federal government as a controlling shareholder 
fundamentally transforms the legal structures of accountability.  In this arti-
cle, we first describe that transformation.  We then turn to how it affects Del-
aware's role in adjudicating intra-corporate disputes and the threats posed to 
Delaware's position by federal government involvement.  Finally, we dis-
cuss how Delaware can "duck." 
II.  WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER 
A.  Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law 
To understand the transformation wrought by government control, 
consider first the Delaware rules when the controlling shareholder is a 
private individual or firm.  Figure 1 provides a basic self dealing hypo-
thetical:  the fictional Victor Black owns controlling interests of 60% in 
Company A and 80% in Company B, and uses his control to lean on 
Company A to enter into a contract on preferential terms with Company B.  
Victor Black's conflict of interest is clear: he benefits by siphoning money 
from Company A (in which he only has a 60% interest) to Company B (in 
which he has an 80% stake).   
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Figure 1. 
 
The Delaware law governing related party transactions is well 
developed. The threshold question is whether Black has control.  If Black 
controls a majority of the voting power, he is deemed to be a controlling 
shareholder.15  If he has a significant but less than majority stake, he is con-
sidered a controlling shareholder if he actually controls the corporate 
decision making.16  In our hypothetical, Black would be a controlling share-
holder of Company A as well as Company B.  As a controlling shareholder, 
he has, under Delaware law, fiduciary duties to noncontrolling share-
holders.17  Delaware law then examines related party transactions under the 
duty of loyalty rubric, and applies an "entire fairness" standard.18  "Entire 
fairness" is understood to encompass "fair price" and "fair dealing."19 
 
                                                                                                             
15See generally 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW § 151.5.1, at GCL-V-34 (5th ed. 2008) (citing, inter alia, In re Tri-Star 
Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 
535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)). 
16Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994). 
17See id. at 1113-14. 
18Id. at 1115-17. 
19Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
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In applying the entire fairness standard to related party transactions, 
Delaware encourages the use of procedural devices such as the involvement 
of independent directors in negotiating and approving such transactions or 
ratification by disinterested shareholders.  When such devices are used  
properly—e.g., if the directors are truly independent and function effectively 
and if shareholders receive full disclosure and their vote is uncoerced—they 
shift the burden of proof with respect to whether the transaction was entirely 
fair to the plaintiff challenging the transaction.20  When a violation of the 
duty of loyalty is found, the remedies include an injunction and damages, 
measured by reference to arm's-length market transactions.21 
In a case like Figure 1, a derivative suit alleging breach of the duty of 
loyalty would likely be filed in Delaware Chancery Court.  Demand would 
probably be excused.  Ordinarily, Delaware courts apply to the so-called 
Aronson test to determine demand futility.22  Under Aronson, a derivative 
plaintiff must allege specific facts that create a reasonable doubt as to 
whether (1) a majority of the board is disinterested or independent or (2) the 
challenged transaction was the product of the board's valid exercise of 
business judgment.23   
Given the presence of a controlling shareholder, there will be many 
instances in which a majority of the board members either have an interest in 
the transaction (e.g., because they represent the controlling shareholder) or 
lack sufficient independence (e.g., because they work for the controlling 
shareholder or have other business relationships with the controlling 
shareholder).24  In these cases, demand will be excused under the first prong 
 
                                                                                                             
20See, e.g., Lynch Commc'n, 638 A.2d at 1117. There is some ambiguity in the Delaware 
case law.  Compare Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (stating, in context of 
self-dealing transaction involving controlling shareholder, that approval by properly functioning 
committee of independent directors would shift burden on entire fairness standard to plaintiffs), with 
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating, in context of merger involving 
material conflict of interest on part of controlling shareholder, that entire fairness applies ab initio 
only to freeze-out mergers with controlling shareholders).  Orman v. Cullman thus raises the 
possibility that entire fairness does not apply to all transactions involving controlling shareholders, 
but only to a subset, namely, freeze-out mergers. 
21See Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("In 
determining damages, the court's 'powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and 
monetary relief as may be appropriate.'" (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714)). 
22Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984). 
23Id. 
24See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1270-73 (Del. Ch. 2008) (excusing demand 
where the board appointed an overseer who solicited sham bids and ultimately awarded a contract to 
his own company).  But see Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051-52 (Del. 2004) (refusing to 
excuse demand where controlling shareholder and founder exercised 94% voting power and had 
close personal friendships with board members). 
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of Aronson.  Perhaps more importantly, if the self-dealing transaction 
involving a controlling shareholder is substantively analyzed under the entire 
fairness test–and thus not protected by the business judgment rule–there is a 
good argument that demand is excused under the second prong of Aronson.25 
 Such an argument would rest on the fact that, since the transaction is subject 
to entire fairness review by the court, there is a reasonable doubt that the 
transaction was the product of the board's valid business judgment.   
Moreover, independent directors' role in assessing a self-dealing 
transaction is closely analogous to independent directors' role in deciding 
whether to have the company bring a lawsuit against insiders.  In both 
instances, they make decisions regarding matters in which they do not have a 
direct interest, but in which other board members do.  Likewise, a conclusion 
that a transaction is protected by the business judgment rule is analogous to a 
conclusion that the company should not bring a lawsuit: in both instances, 
the court does not review the substance of the underlying decision or 
transaction.  In a self-dealing transaction with a controlling shareholder, 
Delaware law is clear that the transaction is subject to entire fairness even if 
approved by independent directors.  In imposing this standard, rather than 
the business judgment rule, Delaware cases make clear that independent 
directors are not sufficiently trusted to dispense with substantive review by 
the court (as the effect of approval by independent directors is not 
reinstatement of the business judgment rule).  Thus, it would make sense if, 
in applying the relevant procedural standard, courts likewise did not defer to 
independent directors (as they would if demand were not excused in such 
cases).  Otherwise, the result would be the somewhat odd structure in which 
the court says that self-dealing transactions with controlling shareholders are 
sufficiently suspect that they are always evaluated under entire fairness, but 
that such cases will never make it to court at all if a board (with a majority of 
independent directors) decides not to pursue it.  
If demand is excused, the court would independently evaluate both the 
financial terms of the transaction and the process leading to the transaction 
and determine whether they comply with the entire fairness standard. In 
short, if the transaction is indeed unfair, there is a significant likelihood that 
the plaintiffs would succeed in either enjoining the transaction or recovering 
damages. The robust protections provided by the duty of loyalty is a function 
of relatively clear rules enforced by private injunctive and damages actions. 
 
                                                                                                             
25To our knowledge, no case directly endorses or rejects the proposition that demand is 
automatically excused under the second prong of Aronson for self-dealing transactions with 
controlling shareholders that, under Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n, are always subjected to entire fairness 
review. 
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B.  Suing the Government as Controlling Shareholder 
When the federal government is the controlling shareholder, this 
structure of accountability is transformed.  Consider a slightly modified 
hypothetical: substitute the Treasury for the fictional Victor Black, the 
fictional Detroit Motors Acceptance Corporation (DMAC) for Company A 
and the fictional Detroit Motors (DM) for Company B, as in Figure 2.  
Suppose, further, that the Treasury leans on DMAC to provide financing to 
DM, and its dealers and customers, on preferential terms.  What sort of 
claims would the noncontrolling shareholders have? 
Figure 2. 
 
Consider, first, claims against the controlling shareholder, the 
Treasury.  An initial hurdle is "sovereign immunity," the doctrine according 
to which the "sovereign" (i.e., the federal government) may only be sued to 
the extent that it gives its permission.26  This has both procedural and 
substantive implications. 
 
                                                                                                             
26E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1982) ("It is axiomatic that the United 
States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for 
jurisdiction."). 
2010] WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER 417 
Procedurally, the law is clear that the federal government and its 
agents may only be sued in federal district court or the court of federal 
claims, depending on the cause of action.27  Any claims that are brought in 
state court may be removed to the appropriate federal court.28 
Substantively, only claims within the federal government's waivers of 
sovereign immunity may be brought.  There are three main waivers: the 
Federal Tort Claims Acts (FTCA),29 the Tucker Act,30 and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.31  The FTCA, as its name indicates, waives sover-
eign immunity with respect to tort actions.32  The Tucker Act waives immu-
nity with respect to claims against the United States "founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, 
or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."33  
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for injunctive relief against 
agency action, but does not provide for damages.34 
Trying to bring a breach of fiduciary duty action against the 
government as a controlling shareholder raises a host of fascinating issues.  
Is a breach of the duty of loyalty a tort for the purposes of the FTCA?35  
Even if the FTCA applies, would the government conduct fall within the 
"discretionary functions" exception?36  As we discuss at length elsewhere, a 
plaintiff's chances under the FTCA, even for a clear cut violation of the duty 
of loyalty, would be highly uncertain and not the sort of case that a rational 
lawyer would take on a contingent fee. 
 
                                                                                                             
2728 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2006). 
28Id. § 1442(a). 
29Id. § 2674. 
30Id. § 1491(a)(1); see also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212 ("[W]e conclude that by giving the 
Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, the Tucker Act 
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those claims." (footnote omitted)). 
315 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
3228 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable [for tort] . . . to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or 
for punitive damages."). 
33Id. § 1491(a)(1). 
345 U.S.C. § 702 (permitting "relief other than money damages"). 
35See generally Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3 (2000); 
Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the 
Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994). 
36Section 2680(a) of title 28 of the United States Code states the FTCA waiver of sovereign 
immunity shall not extend to "[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on part of a federal agency or an employee of 
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
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The Tucker Act issues are every bit as complex.  The Tucker Act does 
not, itself, create any substantive rights.37  In our hypothetical, would there 
be an independent basis for a claim?  Although there are some plausible po-
tential claims, success would be uncertain and would depend on an exten-
sion of current law. 
Finally, under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff would 
face a variety of challenges that derive from the odd situation in which the 
government is acting in a private setting without either accepting applicable 
Delaware law or explicitly opting out.  A plaintiff could argue that federal 
governmental actions that are inconsistent with Delaware law are "not in 
accordance with law" and thus invalid under § 706.38  In response, the gov-
ernment could argue that § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review when "agen-
cy action is committed to agency discretion by law" and that the EESA, 
which authorized the TARP program, did just that.39  As with the other fed-
eral theories, while there are some potential claims, all have uncertain pros-
pects and would require extension of current law. 
C.  An Alternative Strategy: Suing the Officers and Directors 
Delaware's controlling shareholder jurisprudence has two pillars: con-
trolling shareholders owe duties to noncontrolling shareholders in certain cir-
cumstances;40 and the officers and directors of controlled corporations, 
however they are elected, owe duties to the corporation and all its share-
holders.41  When a controlling shareholder uses its power to engineer a con-
flicted transaction, directors play a special role in protecting the non-con-
trolling shareholders in the Delaware system.42  In this section, we consider 
whether there would be plausible claims against the directors of DMAC.  
Assume that DMAC has seven directors, two of whom were nominated by 
the Treasury (but are not Treasury employees), and all of whom were elected 
 
                                                                                                             
37United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2009). 
385 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
39Id. § 701(a)(2). 
40See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *19 (Del. 
Ch. June 24, 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), reprinted in 17 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 551, 585 (1992) ("[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of 
stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes the duties of care 
and loyalty of a director of the corporation."). 
41See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) ("[T]he shareholders of 
a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their board of directors to discharge each of their 
. . . fiduciary duties at all times."). 
42 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994). 
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by a plurality that included the Treasury votes.  Assume that the other five 
directors were not selected by the Treasury. 
Suppose, now, that the board, after the two Treasury-nominated direc-
tors report the Treasury's views, decides unanimously to loan money on 
preferential terms to DM, its customers, and dealers.  What can the share-
holders do? 
The starting point under Delaware law is that all directors, however 
they make it to the boardroom, are expected to attend to the interest of the 
corporation and all of its shareholders: "the law demands of directors . . . 
fidelity to the corporation and all of its shareholders and does not recognize a 
special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class 
electing them . . . ."43  The Delaware Supreme Court made it clear in 
Weinberger v. UOP that designees of a controlling shareholder are not 
thereby insulated from their duties:  
[The controlling shareholder] cannot escape the effects of the 
conflicts it faced, particularly when its designees on [the] board 
did not totally abstain from participation in the matter.  There is 
no "safe harbor" for such divided loyalties in Delaware.  When 
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a 
transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good 
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. 
The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that 
where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the 
burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the 
test of careful scrutiny by the courts.   
 
  There is no dilution of this obligation where one holds 
dual or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context. 
Thus, individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two 
corporations, one of whom is parent and the other subsidiary, 
 
                                                                                                             
43Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 27, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 774, 790 (1988);  Comm. on Corporate Laws, 
ABA Section of Bus. Law, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled Corporation, 
45 BUS. LAW. 429, 430 (1989) (noting that "affiliated and unaffiliated directors alike represent all of 
the shareholders" and stating that "[a]ll directors have the same duties to the corporation and to all 
of its shareholders"); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a 
Director Serve?  A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 766 
(2008). 
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owe the same duty of good management to both corporations 
. . . .44 
But this general principle merely frames the inquiry.  Weinberger 
itself conditioned this strong statement of duty with phrases like "[g]iven the 
absence of any attempt to structure this transaction on an arm's-length basis" 
and "particularly when its designees on [the] board did not totally abstain 
from participation in the matter" and "in the absence of an independent 
negotiating structure or the directors' total abstention from any participation 
in the matter."45  We now know that each of these conditions has, in fact, 
been used to shield conflicted directors and transactions.46 
In the decision to loan money on preferential terms to DM, its 
customers, and dealers, the Treasury obviously had a conflict of interest.  It 
is less obvious that any of the directors did.  The five "independent" direc-
tors, by hypothesis, do not also serve as directors of DM, and are also pre-
sumptively independent of the Treasury.  The two Treasury-designated di-
rectors, by contrast, may face a conflict, depending on their other connec-
tions, if any, with the Treasury. 
So let's fill out the fact pattern a bit.  Suppose that the board discus-
sion proceeds along the following lines: The two Treasury-designated di-
rectors explain to the board how important this transaction is to the Treasury 
and the public interest.  The other directors, in their discussion of the issue, 
take seriously the Treasury's concerns, and, moreover, discuss in depth the 
value to DMAC of maintaining strong and friendly relations with DMAC's 
controlling shareholder, who also plays a regulatory role.  After detailed 
discussion, the board unanimously decides to make the loans. 
In these circumstances, what are the chances that the board members 
face monetary liability?  The independent directors, as described, have no 
direct financial interest in the transaction, and DMAC undoubtedly has a 
section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision.  To be insulated from liability under 
section 102(b)(7), however, they must also have acted in good faith.47  As 
the Delaware Supreme Court recently held, lack of good faith may be shown 
where "'the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of 
 
                                                                                                             
44Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted). 
45Id. at 710-11 (citation omitted). 
46See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117 ("'[An] independent bargaining structure, 
while not conclusive, is strong evidence of the fairness' of a merger transaction." (quoting Rosenblatt 
v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 n.7 (Del. 1985))). 
47See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) ("[A section 102(b)(7) provision] can 
exculpate directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that 
is not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty."). 
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advancing the best interests of the corporation.'"48  If evidence can be ad-
duced to show that the board members realized that making the loans was 
not in the best interest of DMAC and only approved the loans because of the 
pressure exerted by the Treasury and its nominees, they arguably lacked 
good faith and could face monetary liability.  The same would be true, a 
fortiori, for the directors nominated by the Treasury. 
On the other hand, the directors could argue that, given the precarious 
position of DMAC, its vulnerability to governmental regulation, and its de-
pendence on future bailouts from the Treasury, it is in the best interest of 
DMAC to stay on good terms with the government, even if this means 
DMAC needs to make loans that—analyzed without regard to these fac-
tors—are not in best interest of DMAC. 
Whether the Delaware courts would (and should) accept such 
arguments is doctrinally unresolved.  In effect, it amounts to the directors 
arguing that they may, in good faith, approve a detrimental transaction 
because the controlling shareholder has the power to retaliate and inflict 
even worse damage on the corporation. A similar argument (in a case 
involving a private controlling shareholder) was rejected by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.49  In that 
case, however, the court merely held that the approval of directors that were 
so motivated did not constitute an effective cleansing act (and thus did not 
result in shifting the burden of showing entire fairness).50  The issue of 
whether the directors so motivated acted in good faith was not before the 
court.  In a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery—In re Emerging 
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation51—the court held that an 
outside director was not independent and not shielded from liability by 
section 102(b)(7) because he possessed special expertise that should have led 
him to conclude that the transaction proposed by a controlling shareholder 
was unfair.52  The court concluded that the director was motivated by the 
potential future business opportunities he could obtain from the controlling 
shareholder.53  While neither Kahn v. Lynch nor Emerging Communications 
resolves the issue, they show that a potential for personal liability exists, es-
pecially for any nonindependent directors. 
 
                                                                                                             
48Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
49See 638 A.2d at 1113.  In this case, the board of directors approved a merger with the 
corporation's controlling shareholders after the controlling shareholder threatened to proceed with a 
hostile tender offer at a lower price if the transaction was not approved.  Id. at 1118. 
50See id. at 1120-21. 
51No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004). 
52Id. at *35-40. 
53Id. at *35. 
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Note, however, that as long as the Treasury-appointed directors act in 
good faith, any further claims against them are unlikely to succeed.  Specif-
ically, their role in truthfully conveying the Treasury's views cannot be crit-
icized.  Surely this is something that the board should know about.54  Fur-
thermore, even if they vote, their votes were not the but-for cause of the 
decision; it would have passed whether they voted for it or not.55 
But even if both the independent and the Treasury-appointed directors 
are shielded from personal liability by section 102(b)(7), plaintiffs might 
pursue a case in order to secure an injunction to block the loan and to pro-
hibit future loans.  Even this, however, could be a challenge.  Let us assume 
that disinterested directors who decide, after careful deliberation, to favor a 
controlling shareholder who holds the power of life and death over the com-
pany are viewed as acting in good faith, and thus would not have breached 
their fiduciary duties.  Still, the problem remains that it was the demands of 
the controlling shareholder that placed the board in an impossible position. 
And, as we saw above, the controlling shareholder in this case seems to be 
largely beyond the reach of Delaware law. 
Suppose, however, that we focus on the transaction itself rather than 
on the directors, even if the suit is formally against them.  Interestingly, and 
in recognition of the influence that a controlling shareholder exerts whether 
or not it fills the board of directors with designees, the standard for judging 
all transactions between a firm and its controlling shareholder is "entire fair-
ness."56  A conflicted transaction can arguably be enjoined, even if all indi-
vidual directors are insulated by 102(b)(7) provisions.  If, in fact, the terms 
are preferential or below market, that would provide a strong basis for a 
claim that the transaction was not entirely fair.  Thus, for example, in Kahn 
v. Tremont Corp.,57 a case involving a conflict of interest transaction be-
tween two corporations controlled by Harold Simmons, the Delaware Su-
 
                                                                                                             
54See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 43, at 772. 
[S]o long as the constituency directors' representative capacity is transparently 
disclosed to stockholder and fellow directors, constituency directors could be 
permitted to advocate the interests of their sponsors.  That is, the constituency 
directors could attempt to persuade the entire board that their sponsors' interest 
represent or are aligned with the interests of the corporation and all its 
stockholders. 
Id. 
55"[T]he business judgment rule will not be rebutted if the interested directors do not 
constitute a majority of the directors approving the transaction."  Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 144 (2001)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 814 (Del. 1984)). 
56Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del. 1994); Citron v. E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
57694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). 
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preme Court applied the "entire fairness" standard to the transaction and con-
cluded there was a conflict.58  The court examined director conduct only in 
determining whether the special committee had acted sufficiently independ-
ently to shift the burden of proof.59  Finally, it seems, we have come up with 
a plausible theory of attack under Delaware law.60  Even if the directors act-
ed in good faith, noncontrolling shareholders could plausibly seek to enjoin 
the preferential contract. 
There may be another scenario for how a case could land in the lap of 
the Delaware judiciary.  Suppose that the decision to extend the loans is not 
made by the board.  Rather, the CEO of DMAC may have decided to ap-
prove the transaction on his own, after receiving a telephone call from a 
Treasury official explaining the importance of the loan to the government.   
Indeed, such types of pressure were reportedly applied to Ken Lewis by 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, with respect to whether Bank of America 
should disclose to its shareholders the mounting losses at Merrill Lynch,61 
and to Fritz Henderson by Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank with 
respect to whether GM should close a distribution center Norton, Massachu-
setts.62 
As a matter of corporate law, the officers of the company have the au-
thority to approve many transactions without specific board approval.63  To 
the extent that the decision to engage in a transaction is made by an officer, 
however, the analysis under section 102(b)(7) is different.  Section 102(b)(7) 
shields only directors (or, rather, people acting in their capacity as directors) 
from monetary liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty.64  Since section 
 
                                                                                                             
58Id. at 432-33. 
59Id. at 428-30. 
60But see Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 27 n. 36 (Del. Ch. 2002)  (suggesting that "the 
automatic requirement of an entire fairness review" is limited "to the narrow class of cases in which 
there is a controlling shareholder on both sides of a challenged merger"). 
61See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124045610029046349.html (describing testimony by Ken 
Lewis, former CEO of Bank of America, regarding the pressure placed on him by government 
officials not to disclose presumptively material information to the company's shareholders). 
62See Joe Weisenthal, Barney Frank Intervenes to Keep Open Massachusetts GM Facility, 
BUS. INSIDER (ONLINE), June 5, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/barney-frank-intervenes-to-
keep-open-massachussets-gm-facility-2009-6 (reporting on a call placed by Barney Frank to CEO of 
GM regarding the closure of a Massachusetts car parts warehouse).  The facility was kept open.  See 
George F. Will, Barney Frank, Car Guy; And Green Guy.  So He Pressures GM, NEWSWEEK, 
June 22, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/201949. 
63See, e.g., Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350, 
352 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931) (stating corporate president's implied powers include "all acts of an 
ordinary nature which by usage or necessity are incidents to his office and by virtue of his office he 
may enter into a contract and bind his corporation."). 
64See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (specifying the "personal liability of a 
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102(b)(7) does not apply to fiduciary duty breaches by officers acting in their 
capacity as officers, it would present no barrier to a lawsuit. 
Moreover, a CEO of a government-controlled company is clearly de-
pendent on the goodwill of his controlling shareholder for his continued 
tenure.  If the CEO caves to governmental pressure, it is at least plausible to 
assert that the CEO acted to preserve his own position as an executive, and 
not because he sincerely believed that he was serving the best interest of the 
corporation.  As such, the CEO could be deemed not to have acted in good 
faith and section 102(b)(7), even if it were to apply, would not shield him 
from monetary liability.65 
But while a suit against an officer would have an easier time surviving 
a challenge under section 102(b)(7), it raises additional complications as to 
whether demand would be excused.  Conceptually, for a shareholder to bring 
a derivative lawsuit—and most of these lawsuits would be derivative law-
suits66—that shareholder would first have to make a demand on the com-
pany's board to bring the lawsuit itself.67 In practice, derivative plaintiffs in 
Delaware almost always claim that the demand is excused because it is 
futile.68 
While Delaware courts ordinarily apply the Aronson test to determine 
demand futility,69  in some situations a standard announced by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Rales v. Blasband applies.70  The Rales standard effec-
tively eliminates the second prong of the Aronson test and requires a deriv-
                                                                                                             
director"). 
65See id. (stating that director exculpation is not available for "acts or omissions not in good 
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law"). 
66Derivative lawsuits assert a claim on behalf of the corporation.  The most straightforward 
way to determine whether a lawsuit is derivative is to inquire whether, if damages are payable, they 
would be paid to the corporation or to the shareholders directly.  Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & 
Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).  Additionally, a lawsuit that claims that Company 
A extended a loan on preferential terms to Company B, which is controlled by the same 
shareholders, is a derivative lawsuit since Company A suffers the harm (it receives a below-market 
interest rate) and would receive any damages.  See id. (identifying "who suffered the alleged harm 
(the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually)" as another method to distinguish direct 
from derivative lawsuits). 
67DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) 
68See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of 
Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 65 (concluding 
that "derivative litigation in the United States nearly always proceeds under the allegation that 
demand would be 'futile' and therefore should be excused"); cf. FLI Deep Marine LLC v. McKim, 
No. 4138-VCN, 2009 WL 1204363, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2009) ("[W]here a shareholder instead 
chooses to make a demand upon the board of directors, she concedes the independence of a majority 
of the board . . . and is precluded from . . . arguing that demand should be excused because the 
directors are conflicted."). 
69See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
70Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-35 (Del. 1993). 
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ative plaintiff to allege specific facts that create a reasonable doubt as to 
whether a majority of the board in office at the time demand would have 
been made was disinterested or independent.71  Rales is relevant in a case in 
which the board, at the time of demand, did not consist of the same members 
as the board that approved the challenged transaction.72  The rationale for the 
revised test is that, since the incumbent board had no role in approving the 
underlying transaction, it is in a position to determine whether a lawsuit 
should be brought even if the underlying transaction was not the product of 
the valid exercise of business judgment of a different board.73 
The Delaware Supreme Court has identified three scenarios in which 
the Rales standard applies.  The first scenario was the one at issue in Rales: 
the challenged decision had been made by the board of a different cor-
poration.74  The second involves a decision made by a board, the majority of 
whose members have since been replaced.75  The third scenario, of interest 
here, is when the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of 
the board.76  "The [Delaware] Supreme Court included the [third] scenario 
out of a concern that demand upon a board should not be excused when a 
board did not have the opportunity to consider [the] corporate action [at 
issue]."77 
The third scenario seems to fit the case in which the CEO approves a 
transaction under pressure from a government controlling shareholder 
without seeking board approval.  If Rales applies to this situation, for de-
mand to be excused, a derivative plaintiff would have to raise doubts as to 
the disinterestedness and independence of a majority of the board.  Inside 
directors are generally not regarded as independent of a controlling 
shareholder, but generally constitute far less than a majority of a board.  
Whether a derivative plaintiff could satisfy the Rales test would thus depend 
on whether the plaintiff could adduce sufficient facts to challenge the inde-
pendence or disinterestedness of a sufficient number of outside directors, 
both directors selected by the Treasury and others. 
Although our hypothetical seems to fit squarely in the last Rales 
scenario, it is not entirely clear that Rales actually applies in this context. 
 
                                                                                                             
71Id. at 934. 
72Id. 
73See id. at 933 ("Where there is no conscious decision by directors to act or refrain from 
acting, the business judgment rule has no application." (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 
(Del. 1984))). 
74Rales, 634 A.2d at 934. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 353 n.29 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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The underlying rationale for applying Rales to officers' decisions that were 
not approved by the board is that the board, not having been involved in the 
business decision, is in a good position to determine whether a lawsuit 
should proceed.  There is no indication that the court, in announcing the 
Rales standard, specifically focused on the application of the last Rales 
scenario to instances in which the underlying transaction would not be 
accorded business judgment protection even if approved by independent 
directors.  But the application of Rales in that context would generate exactly 
the tension that we discussed before: independent directors, who would lack 
the power, by approving the transaction, to eliminate substantive judicial 
review (through changing the substantive standard to business judgment) 
would have the power to eliminate substantive review by refusing to bring a 
lawsuit after demand has been made.  Moreover, if they would have this 
power only in instances in which the underlying transaction was not 
submitted to the board (since otherwise Aronson would apply, rather than 
Rales), this would generate perverse incentives for companies with 
controlling shareholders not to seek prior board approval for suspicious 
transactions, incentives that run counter to the process-oriented spirit of 
Delaware corporate law.  For these reasons, we would regard the issue of 
whether Rales applies to such cases as unresolved. 
III.  WHY DELAWARE SHOULD AVOID A FIGHT WITH WASHINGTON 
AND HOW IT SHOULD DO SO: A THEORY OF DUCKING 
For some set of transactions, Delaware courts may be asked to look 
into transactions in which the government, as controlling shareholder, has a 
conflict of interest. But is this good news for Delaware?  Should Delaware 
want the case? When the politics of automobile industry bailouts is com-
bined with the politics of corporate law, we submit that Delaware will find 
itself in an impossible position.  Historically, Delaware has generally 
avoided fights with Washington.78  If presented with a situation resembling 
our hypothetical, Delaware should want to continue that history.  It can do so 
by "ducking" the case under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19. 
 
                                                                                                             
78See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 714-15 (concluding "Delaware has so far been 
successful in fending off . . . potential threats" to its "dominant position in corporate law"); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate  Law, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1573, 1617 (2005) (stating that Delaware "eschews controversy" and prefers to address 
reform through its courts rather than legislation or public hearings). 
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A.  Is This a Case that Delaware Should Want? 
In light of our earlier discussion, let us assume that a claim attacking 
the conflicted transaction has been filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery 
and will not be removed or dismissed.  Consider how it could play out and 
what it would mean for Delaware.  The core, substantive question would be 
whether the Treasury improperly pressured DMAC to loan money to DM on 
preferential terms.  If litigated in the Court of Chancery, we would enjoy the 
spectacle of senior Treasury officials being called to testify under oath in a 
deposition or trial regarding the Treasury's role in the transaction.79  There 
would be fights over whether a sitting Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury could be forced to testify in a civil suit, whether his actions are 
protected by executive privilege, and so forth. 
As controversial as these matters would be, imagine what would 
happen if a Delaware chancellor actually enjoined the loans from DMAC to 
DM or found that corporate directors or officers, acting in accordance with 
the Treasury directions, were subject to monetary liability.  Congress would 
explode in outrage: One of the smallest states in the Union is daring to 
interfere with national economic policy!  After all, Congressmen would 
argue, the taxpayers bailed out DMAC!  As majority owners, surely they get 
to decide whether to do this or not!  Senators would convene hearings:  
"we've got the right and responsibility to ask these questions."80  Barney 
Frank would come after Delaware for obstructing federal policy.  Imagine 
the threats from Congress and even the White House to displace Delaware if 
it dared to stand in the way of rescuing the automobile industry on behalf of 
"fat cats," "speculators" or even "locusts."81 
 
                                                                                                             
79To get a sense of the politics of the controversy over the approval of the SEC's settlement 
with Bank of America regarding the SEC's disclosure claims arising out of the merger with Merrill 
Lynch, see generally Kara Scannell et al., Judge Tosses Out Bonus Deal—SEC Pact with BofA over 
Merril Is Slammed; New York Weighs Charges Against Lewis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A1.  
See also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rakoff, J.) 
(rejecting a proposed consent judgment). 
80Whoriskey & Marr, supra note 7 (quoting Sen. Mark Warner). 
81See Derrick Henry, Obama Decries 'Fat Cat Bankers,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/obama-decries-fat-cat-bankers/ (quoting President 
Obama: "'I did not run for office to be helping out a bunch of fat cat bankers on Wall Street'"); Jim 
Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy Protection; U.A.W. and Fiat to Take 
Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A1 (stating that President Obama refers to objecting 
bondholders as "speculators"); Ashley Seager, Germany Pledges Code to Curb Hedge Fund 
"Locusts," GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 2007, at 41 (stating that German regulators refer to hedge 
funds as "locusts"). 
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In thinking about Delaware's place in the corporate law landscape, it is 
always worth remembering that Congress has sufficient power under the 
Commerce Clause to nationalize corporate law.82  It could decide tomorrow 
to create a federal incorporation regime that would preempt state corporate 
law, thereby putting Delaware out of business.  In many respects, the federal 
government is not only the controlling shareholder of DMAC, with the pow-
er to retaliate, but also has potential control over, and the power to retali-ate 
against, Delaware corporate law. 
Delaware, of course, derives substantial profits from being the domi-
cile of choice for publicly traded corporations.83  Naturally, Delaware deci-
sion makers would not want to endanger the continued flow of these profits 
to Delaware residents and the Delaware fisc.  As we have discussed else-
where, Delaware has developed a refined strategy of staying out of the poli-
tical limelight.84  Although there will always be people attacking Delaware's 
position as illegitimate,85 such criticism does not gain political traction so 
long as Delaware does not antagonize important organized interests. 
From that perspective, taking a stand on controversial and partisan 
issues—such as whether, in a specific case, it is legitimate for the federal 
government to induce government-controlled companies to take actions 
considered by the federal government to be economically beneficial, even if 
they do not benefit the minority shareholders in the government-controlled 
company—is about the last thing that Delaware would want to do.  This 
class of cases thus calls for a different strategy which Delaware has some-
times employed in the past:86 the strategy of ducking. 
B.  A Theory of Ducking 
Assuming for now that this is one of those rare situations in which 
Delaware should duck, how should it do so?  To start, what makes a good 
ducking strategy? 
 
                                                                                                             
82See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 598 (2003) ("If 
Congress wishes, it can swoop in and take over any major aspect of corporate law, as it often has, 
and more often has threatened."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1585-86. 
83See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002) (describing and quantifying Delaware's benefits). 
84See Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1617-18. 
85See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Rogue State, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2002, at 20, 23 (stating 
that "Delaware's loose rules amount to an invitation to engage in chicanery"). 
86See Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1621 (suggesting that Delaware tends to duck "hot 
potato" issues such as executive compensation because they are prone to trigger "populist anger"). 
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First, Delaware should only duck when it is necessary to do so, when 
important Delaware interests are at stake.  If it ducks unnecessarily, it risks 
losing its central position in corporate law. 
Second, Delaware should only duck when doing so would be effective 
in avoiding a no-win situation.  Otherwise, it is pointless.   Moreover, it 
should only choose instances in which ducking is politically defensible. 
Third, if Delaware ducks, it should do so with regard to issues that are 
peripheral to Delaware's position in corporate law or which minimally 
distort settled doctrine.  Thus, preferably, it should find a procedural rather 
than a substantive rationale for ducking.  Furthermore, in ducking, it should 
strive for a facially neutral principle so as not to call unnecessary attention to 
itself. 
Finally, because of its obligations to the parties, it should try to duck 
only when the parties have a plausibly adequate, or superior, alternative 
forum in which their claims can be adjudicated. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in In re Bear Stearns Cos. 
Shareholder Litigation87 provides an excellent example of an appropriate 
and successful duck.88  In order to ensure that its emergency merger with J.P. 
Morgan Chase would be approved by its reluctant shareholders, Bear Stearns 
issued just under 40% of its shares to J.P. Morgan Chase in a share ex-
change, with no limit on additional market purchases, thereby rendering the 
shareholder vote a fait accompli.89  As we have argued elsewhere, this case 
raised difficult and fundamental issues under Delaware law, issues that had 
broad implication for shareholders' statutory right to veto mergers and the 
fiduciary duties of boards not to undermine this right.90  On the other hand, 
the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan Chase merger had been pressed by the Fed 
and the Treasury as necessary to prevent the collapse of the international 
financial system.91 
Contemporaneous actions challenging the stock swap were filed in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery and New York Supreme Court.92  Vice Chan-
cellor Parsons, on motion by the defendants, stayed the Delaware action in 
 
                                                                                                             
87No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 515 (2008). 
88Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 715. 
89In re Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992, at *3, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 519. 
90Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 744. 
91See In re Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992, at *2, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 517 
("To preserve the stability and orderliness of the financial markets, the Federal Reserve acted 
promptly to resolve the Bear Stearns situation."). 
92Id. at *3, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 519. 
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favor of the New York action.93  This stay was necessary because Delaware 
was caught on the horns of a dilemma: it would be politically dangerous for 
Delaware to confront the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U. S. 
Department of Treasury on a matter with implications for the stability of the 
financial system; but upholding the share exchange posed hard questions of 
Delaware takeover law. 
The stay in favor of the New York case was effective in that it allowed 
Delaware to avoid potential conflict with the Fed and politically defensible 
in that the stated basis was comity towards a sister state court, a legitimate 
and important consideration in a federal system.  Though the underlying sub-
stantive issue was important for Delaware, the rationale for the ducking was 
based on malleable principles of comity jurisprudence, which are both 
peripheral to Delaware's corporate law and unlikely to generate a precedent 
that future Delaware courts will feel bound to follow.  The decision was also 
minimal insofar as it avoided the conflict without reworking or unsettling 
Delaware substantive mergers and acquisitions law.  Moreover, the stay was 
facially neutral in that it did not favor plaintiffs or defendants on the merits. 
Finally, plaintiffs had a plausibly adequate alternative forum; the New York 
Supreme Court had all the parties in front of it and could adjudicate all 
claims.94 
How might Delaware duck a confrontation with the federal govern-
ment in our hypothetical suit against DMAC's directors?  There are some 
bad alternatives.  It could, for example, hold the transaction entirely fair even 
if it was not.  It could refuse to evaluate the entire fairness of the transaction 
based on some generally applicable rule, such as a general holding that, if no 
individual director has violated his fiduciary duties, self-dealing transactions 
with controlling shareholders enjoy the protection of the business judgment 
rule, or that demand is not excused in these kinds of cases.  It could exploit 
judicial discretion in the granting of equitable relief in a way that ignored the 
realities of the matter by, for example, refusing to grant an injunction 
because there was no irreparable harm or because the risk of harm from 
enjoining the loan outweighed the risk to plaintiff of not enjoining. 
If, in fact, the loan is not entirely fair, these solutions are clearly prob-
lematic.  Is there a better way out? 
 
                                                                                                             
93Id. at *8, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 527. 
94See id. at *4, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 520 (stating that "[t]he Delaware Action 
closely parallels the New York Action"). 
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C.  Ducking Under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19 
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19 ("Joinder of Persons Needed for 
Just Adjudication") provides the optimal basis for ducking the issues posed 
by the hypothetical.  Delaware's Rule 19 tracks the comparable Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
 
(a)  Persons to be joined if feasible.  A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the Court 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be 
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.  If 
the person has not been so joined, the Court shall order that the 
person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff 
but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or in 
a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the 
venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from 
the action. 
 
(b)  Determination by Court whenever joinder not feasible.  If a 
person as described in paragraph (a)(1) and (2) hereof cannot 
be made a party, the Court shall determine whether in equity 
and good conscience the action should proceed among the 
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable.  The factors to be 
considered by the Court include:  First, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial 
to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping 
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
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absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c)  Pleading reasons for nonjoinder.  A pleading asserting a 
claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, 
of any persons as described in paragraph (a)(1) and (2)  hereof 
who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 
 
(d)  Exception of class actions.  This rule is subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23.95 
Notwithstanding the confusing phrasing and structure of the rule, it 
provides a fairly straightforward three-step analytic structure.96  First, is the 
absentee needed for just adjudication?  A party is "required/necessary" if, as 
the rule states, 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest.97 
Second, is joinder of the necessary absentee feasible?  If yes, then the 
person must be joined.  If, on the other hand, joinder is not feasible, then the 
analysis proceeds to the third step—whether the case should proceed or be 
dismissed.  In other words, should the absentee be regarded as "indispen-
sable?" 
Consider, then, how this applies to the question of whether the 
Treasury is an "indispensable" party in our hypothetical lawsuit against the 
directors.  In the first step, one could argue that, as the dominant force apply-
 
                                                                                                             
95DEL. CT. CH. R. 19. 
96See generally 4 RICHARD D. FREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 19 (3d ed. 1997) 
(interpreting the very similar FED. R. CIV. P. 19).  Federal court interpretation of parallel court rules 
is given "great weight" by Delaware courts.  See, e.g., Nat'l  Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 
7278, 1983 WL 8946, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 1983), reprinted in 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 610, 614 
(1983) (citing Canaday v. Super. Ct. in and for New Castle County, 119 A.2d 347 (Del. 1955)). 
97DEL. CT. CH. R. 19(a). 
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ing pressure to proceed with the transaction, the Treasury is a "required" or 
"necessary" party.  Clearly, the Treasury, as a controlling shareholder, would 
be principally liable for any damages awarded to the corporation.  As such, it 
is unclear whether, in the absence of the Treasury, complete damage relief 
could be awarded.  Moreover, if the suit is for injunctive relief, the grant of 
an injunction would, as a practical matter, impair or impede the Treasury's 
ability to protect its interest. 
Second, is joinder feasible?  In our hypothetical, the answer is clearly 
a negative.  As discussed above, there is exclusive federal jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1346 and any case would be immediately removed under 28 
U.S.C. § 1442. 
We thus come to the third and critical step, namely, since joinder of 
the Treasury is not feasible, should the case proceed or be dismissed?  Under 
the rule, there are four factors.  "First, to what extent [might] a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence . . . be prejudicial to the person or those 
already parties[?]"98  Under Delaware case law, "[i]t is not necessary to join 
a person whose interests are fully protected by the parties already present in 
the case."99  But in our hypothetical, the Treasury and the DMAC directors 
who face a claim for damages have conflicting interests, especially if the di-
rectors' defense is that "the controlling shareholder made me do it."  In such 
circumstances, not only will the directors not represent the Treasury's inter-
ests, it is also hard to see how they can adequately represent their own inter-
ests in the Treasury's absence. 
The second factor is "the extent to which, by protective provisions in 
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can 
be lessened or avoided."100  Joyce v. Cuccia provides an example of a situa-
tion in which an absentee's claimed rights to ownership of stock can be pro-
tected in crafting judgment.101  In that case, the court refused to find the 
absent party who claimed ownership of half of a block of stock to be an in-
dispensable party because "any decree granting specific performance [could] 
be made subject to [the absent party's] entitlement to the stock as determined 
by [court order]."102  By contrast, one can plausibly argue that the hypo-
thetical presents a unitary issue—is the transaction entirely fair?—and that 
there is no way to shape the relief to lessen or avoid prejudice. 
 
                                                                                                             
98Id. R. 19(b). 
99Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1073 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 
(Del. 1985). 
100DEL. CT. CH. R. 19(b). 
101Joyce v. Cuccia, No. Civ. A. 14,953, 1997 WL 257448, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. May 14, 
1997), reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 834, 853-55 (1998). 
102Id. at *10, reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L at 855. 
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The third factor is "whether a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence will be adequate."103  This factor points against holding the Treasury to 
be an indispensable party; the transaction could be enjoined and monetary 
liability imposed on the directors, if appropriate, in the absence of the 
Treasury. 
The fourth factor is "whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder."104  This raises the question 
whether complete relief would be available in federal court.  As with all the 
legal issues raised by government control, this is a complicated issue that 
does not have a clear answer.  The issue is whether fiduciary duty claims 
against directors would be within the federal court's "supplemental juris-
diction" ("pendent party jurisdiction") under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Although 
§ 1367 codified "pendent party jurisdiction," it only did so for actions in 
federal district court.  If, as discussed above, a breach of fiduciary duty is a 
tort claim for purposes of the FTCA, all claims could be brought in federal 
district court and § 1367 would provide for pendent party jurisdiction over 
the directors, permitting complete relief.  On the other hand, if a breach of 
fiduciary duty is not a tort but, instead, a claim for "unliquidated damages in 
cases not sounding in tort," the case would fall under the Tucker Act and 
would have to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.  In that event, the 
pre-§ 1367 principles would determine whether there was pendent party ju-
risdiction (there are no Court of Federal Claims cases on point). 
As this analysis of Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19 suggests, 
there is sufficient flexibility within the rule, and sufficient factual basis, for a 
court to hold the Treasury to be an "indispensable party."  Would it be advis-
able to do so?  Would it be another exemplary duck? 
Consider the factors identified above in our theory of ducking.  As 
noted earlier, avoiding a confrontation with the Treasury and Congress is 
important for Delaware as such a confrontation could endanger Delaware's 
historic and distinctive role in corporate law and the economic benefits 
Delaware obtains from maintaining this role. 
Second, a dismissal under Rule 19 would be effective in allowing 
Delaware to avoid a conflict.  It would leave the substantive decision to the 
federal judiciary, a body more insulated against political attacks and with 
greater legitimacy in rendering decisions of national importance.  Even 
though the federal judiciary would apply Delaware corporate law in render-
ing its decision on the conduct of the officers and directors, the underlying 
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fundamental principles—that controlling shareholders may not engage in 
unfair transactions—are uncontroversial.  The controversial issues—how 
should these principles be applied, should they be modified when the con-
trolling shareholder is the federal government and purports to pursue na-
tional interest, and was a specific transaction really unfair?—would be deter-
mined by federal judges based on the specific facts of a case and without 
much guidance from Delaware precedents.  Because both federal and Dela-
ware interests support Delaware's abstention, the decision would be 
politically defensible. 
Third, a dismissal would have minimal impact on settled doctrine.  
Because Rule 19 is procedural, a dismissal would avoid any changes to 
substantive Delaware corporate law.  To the contrary, not rendering a sub-
stantive decision in these cases would avoid potential distortions that could 
result if Delaware tried to squeeze self-dealing transactions with a govern-
mental controlling shareholder into its general jurisprudence of controlling 
shareholder fiduciary duties.  Moreover, holding the Treasury to be an indis-
pensable party would be facially neutral inasmuch as it is based on a 
plausible interpretation of a long-standing and generally applicable proce-
dural rule. 
Finally, the parties would have a plausibly adequate alternative forum 
in which all issues could be resolved in a single proceeding, at least if there 
is pendent party jurisdiction. 
Delaware's central role in corporate law depends on Delaware courts 
deciding most important questions that arise under its corporate law.  But a 
variety of circumstances arise that counsel in favor of not acting.  Some-
times, considerations of comity lead Delaware to defer to other states.  Fed-
eral control of a Delaware corporation, we suggest, is another context in 
which discretion is the better part of valor. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the last two years, the United States has faced a historic collapse of 
its financial markets and its banking sector.  In response, the federal govern-
ment has embarked on unprecedented initiatives.  Along the way, it has end-
ed up with control of some major publicly traded Delaware corporations.  
Amongst the numerous financial, political, and legal challenges raised by 
these initiatives is the effect of government control on Delaware's jurispru-
dence of controlling shareholders. 
It remains to be seen how long this exceptional period will last.  If the 
Treasury exits from these positions quickly, we may never have to resolve 
the legal issues raised by government ownership.  If the Treasury holds these 
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positions for the long term, a new, federal legal structure will have to be de-
veloped, probably involving federal incorporation for the controlled firms. 
In the meantime, Delaware should keep its head down.  It has nothing 
to gain, and much to lose, from a confrontation with the Treasury, the Fed-
eral Reserve, and Congress.  So long as it can avoid such conflicts without 
doing substantial damage to its law or its place in the corporate land-scape, it 
would be well advised to do so. 
